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Good history books do more than relate history. A good history book
provokes the reader to think about the present, to consider the relevance of
past experiences to the issues of current society. A good history volume
should be, not an enclosed package of facts and interpretations, but a
point of departure for the reader's thbughts. When a history book success-
fully fulfills this provocative function, it deserves the attention of readers
whose interests lie more with the present than with the past.
William Cronon's Changes in the Land' and Stephen Innes' Labor in
a New Land,2 two recent works on colonial New England society, are
good history books by this definition. Both are thoughtful, well-digested
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1. W. CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW
ENGLAND (1983) [hereinafter cited by author and page number only].
2. S. INNEs, LABOR IN A NEW LAND: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
SPRINGFIELD (1983) [hereinafter cited by author and page number only].
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studies of critical themes in the development of early American society.
Although both are aimed at an audience of colonial American scholars
(and are likely to enjoy a wide and favorable reception among that audi-
ence), the works are fine stimulants for ruminations on aspects of contem-
porary American society; both therefore deserve a considerably broader
readership. These works raise, in intriguing and revealing historical set-
tings, fundamental issues about man's relationship with the land and na-
ture and about the role of property in American society. Both works fur-
nish the reader with valuable historical and cultural perspectives on
current resource-allocation controversies. These works, however valuable
they may be for readers who are historical scholars, are perhaps more
valuable for those who are not.
Cronon's work considers the land use practices and property ownership
concepts of the early New England colonists and compares them with the
substantially differing approaches of the aboriginal Algonquian Indians.
Cronon's story is one of conflict: a conflict between, on one side, an evolv-
ing capitalist property system that treated natural resources as economic
commodities and that granted landowners extensive, exclusive land ex-
ploitation rights, and, on the other side, an Indian property system char-
acterized by complex shared land use rights and more ecologically stable
land use practices. His illuminating cross-cultural comparison readily in-
vites further comparison with twentieth-century land use practices and
ideologies.
Innes' volume examines the growth of capitalism and economic individ-
ualism in seventeenth-century Springfield, Massachusetts. As capitalism
came to Springfield and other New England towns, it changed substan-
tially the role of land in the social life of the community. In pre-capitalist
days, land and community were one, and land use decisions, whether
made individually or communally, were designed to further social and
communal goals as well as economic ones. As capitalism advanced, land
was viewed increasingly as an economic commodity with land use deci-
sions based more exclusively on economic factors. Land was used more to
make money and less to control and reflect the community's social and
religious life.
Both these books on early colonial America provoke the reader to recon-
sider many assumptions about land use and private property, assumptions
that permeate American property law and contemporary land use plan-
ning. Together with other recent scholarly studies, these works provide
the raw material for readers to identify and evaluate various trends in
seventeenth-century New England man-land practices and ideologies, a
process of synthesis that raises many questions about man's current orien-
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tation toward land and nature and sheds light on contemporary
difficulties.
I.
To the English colonists who first arrived in numbers in the 1630's, the
New England countryside appeared largely unused and only lightly popu-
lated, more a wilderness than an inhabited country. Yet this seemingly
virginal land was in use and subject to private ownership by various tribes
of the Algonquian language group. These native inhabitants had long
subjected the countryside to a complex system of land ownership and use
that enabled them, with their late Stone-Age skills, to obtain sustenance
and shelter from the rocky New England land. As Cronon relates, lands
that the arriving settlers viewed as unowned, unused, and even wasted
under English versions of the man-land relationship were viewed much
differently by the native Algonquian inhabitants with their differing cul-
ture and ideology. The arriving colonists, weighted down with their own
cultural assumptions and ideologies, were ill-prepared to comprehend
these vastly different Indian land use patterns. 3
In his study of the ecological transformation of the New England coun-
tryside during the colonial era, Cronon details these complex Indian land
use and property ownership practices.4 Compared to the arriving white
settlers, the Indians lived lightly on the land. Seasonal migrations and
small village sizes reduced the Indians' impact on any one location. Indi-
ans gathered and hunted only food that was plentiful and easily accessible,
and moved on or changed diets when scarcities appeared. These practices,
interpreted as laziness by contemporary whites, served to protect the re-
3. W. CRONON, at 33, 56-58, 66-70. See J. AXTELL, THE EUROPEAN AND THE INDIAN: ESSAYS
IN THE ETHNOHISTORY OF COLONIAL NORTH AMERIcA'47-53 (1981); F. JENNINGS, THE INVA-
SION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 15-16, 136-37 (1975);
A. VAUGHAN, NEW ENGLAND FRONTIER: PURITANS AND INDIANS 1620-1675, at 110-13 (rev. ed.
1979); Wallace, Political Organization and Land Tenure Among the Northwestern Indians,
1600-1830, 13 Sw. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 301, 304, 311-12 (1957). For bibliographic references to
studies of Indian-colonial dealings in early New England, see A. VAUGHAN, supra, at vi-xiv.
4. Cronon's professed aim in his study is "to write an ecological history of colonial New Eng-
land." W. CRONON, at vii. He devotes much of his book to "such things as pine trees, pigs, beavers,
soils, fields of corn, forest watersheds, and other elements of the New England landscape." Id. His
thesis is that "the shift from Indian to European dominance in New England . . . involved funda-
mental reorganizations . . . in the region's plant and animal communities." Id. Industrial societies
tend to assume that problems of pollution, natural resource supply, and ecological destruction arose
only in the modern age with the coming of industrialization and increased population pressures. Cro-
non's work provides a case-study refutation of this assumption. He explains in detail how plant and
animal populations in New England were dramatically altered by the pre-machine-age agricultural
practices of the sparsely populated early New England settlements. See infra note 39 and accompany-
ing text. This essay, with its focus on the comparative property ownership and land use ideologies of
the Indians and colonists, largely ignores Cronon's analysis of the marked impacts of European prac-
tices on the pre-contact Indian land use orientation. It also largely ignores the considerable detail
Cronon presents on the ecological impacts of European practices.
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productive capabilities of useful plant and animal species. Because food
was not available to the Indian evenly throughout the year, there were
periods of want as well as periods of plenty, particularly among northern
tribes. The Indians generally did not prepare for expected shortages by
gathering and storing extra food during times of plenty, preferring instead
to suffer periods of temporary undernourishment. This indisposition to
hoard food further reduced the Indian impact on the land.5
The countryside of early New England was divided among numerous
Indian villages, each generally inhabited by a couple hundred residents.
The leader or sachem of each village held sovereign title as village repre-
sentative to all of the village lands. Boundaries among villages, although
subject to occasional change, were relatively clear and respected. In many
instances, sachems owed homage to higher or stronger sachems of the
same tribe, and some villages at times had easement-like rights to use or
to cross lands held by other villages. But generally, the village was the
basic unit of sovereign land ownership with tribal land co-ownership rare
or unknown.'
The average Indian group that comprised a single village migrated sea-
sonally on the lands it owned. Village groups in northern areas with cli-
mates hostile to agriculture were pure hunter-gatherer societies. 7 Villages
in areas where agriculture was possible typically lived on their agricul-
tural lands in the warm months; like their northern compatriots, they mi-
grated farther inland during colder months and dispersed themselves for
hunting. A village group usually changed its camp locations only after a
number of years, when agricultural fertility had declined, firewood had
become scarce, or a site had otherwise become undesirable. Such seasonal
migrations were possible because the Indians were content with insubstan-
tial, portable dwellings and possessed few personal belongings. Southern
tribes set aside village lands for hunting, burning the land regularly to aid
travel and to remove low-level shrubs that hindered the hunter's sighting
of animals. These fires, kept low on the ground to avoid damage to ma-
ture trees, gave the countryside a park-like appearance. More impor-
tantly, the fires provided room for the growth of forage grasses and
5. See W. CRONON, at 37-45, 48-50, 53; E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREE-
DOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 54-56 (1975); Martin, The European Impact on the
Culture of a Northeastern Algonquian Tribe: An Ecological Interpretation, 31 Wm. & MARY Q. 3,
11-16 (3d ser. 1974). Compare F. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 65-67 (noting evidence of Indian food
surpluses used in trade).
6. See W. CRONON, at 37-38, 58-61; F. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 67-71, 112-16, 136-37; A.
VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 32-34, 51, 105-07; Wallace, supra note 3, at 311-12.
7. These groups commonly migrated in the warmer months to the seacoast areas to feed on sea-
food and waterfowl. In colder months they spread themselves more thinly across the northern forests
for late fall and winter game hunting.
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thereby stimulated the growth of the animal populations sought by Indian
hunters.8
Individual Indian families generally possessed and tilled their own agri-
cultural lands. Such lands were privately owned and used until soil fertil-
ity declined or the village changed its camp locationj at which point the
lands were abandoned without afterthought. Indians commonly mixed
several crops-corn, beans and squash, for example-in a single field, a
technique that produced fields that seemed messy and overgrown in com-
parison to the clean, single-crop English fields but that yielded substantial
benefits by reducing weeds, preserving soil moisture, and increasing crop
yields. Prior to the colonists' arrival, the Indians did not use deep-cutting
plows, animal power, or fertilizer in their husbandry practices, nor did
they enclose their fields with fences-practices which would have had
substantial effects on natural ecological balances.9
The Indian land tenure system's incorporation of diverse forms of indi-
vidual and group ownership is particularly worthy of scrutiny. In their
use of property, the Indians clearly embraced a system of private owner-
ship, although they carved up property rights much differently than the
colonists did and retained more property rights for communal use.1° In-
dian families owned exclusively the land on which their wigwams or other
dwellings stood. This exclusive right of use continued until the family
abandoned the land. Village agricultural lands were divided up and
owned by individual families, with each family's ownership rights in the
farm lands continuing only so long as the family made actual use of the
lands. The family's rights
did not include many of the privileges Europeans commonly associ-
ated with ownership: a user could not (and saw no need to) prevent
other village members from trespassing or gathering nonagricultural
8. See W. CRONON, at 37-51; J. AXTELL, supra note 3, at 47-48, 62-63; F. JENNINGS, supra
note 3, at 61-62; D. LEACH, FLINTLOCK AND TOMAHAWK: NEW ENGLAND IN KING PHILIP'S WAR
2-3 (1958); N. SALISBURY, MANITOU AND PROVIDENCE: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE MAKING
OF NEW ENGLAND, 1500-1643, at 33-34 (1982); A. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 30-31, 46-47.
Cronon's work is noticeably and regrettably devoid of quantitative data to support the developments
that he traces, such as date-specific data pertaining to animal populations (both wild and domesti-
cated), the quantities of agricultural products shipped out of New England, the acreage tilled or used
as pasture, and the proportion of New England occupied by colonists and Indians.
9. See W. CRONON, at 42-45; J. AXTELL, supra note 3, at 50-52; F. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at
62-63; E. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 54-56; N. SALISBURY, supra note 8, at 30-31.
10. Individual Indians owned exclusively those personal goods that they collected or made with
their own hands. Yet Indians regularly made "gifts" of personal property to establish and preserve
social ties with other Indians and villages. This gift giving, usually undertaken with an expectation of
later reciprocity by the recipient, "was a crucial means for establishing and reproducing one's position
in society." W. CRONON, at 61-62 (citation omitted). See id. at 59-62; F. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at
102-04; N. SALISBURY, supra note 8, at 44, 48-49; W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA
20-22, 32-33 (1975).
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food on such lands, and had no conception of deriving rent from
them. Planting fields were "possessed" by an Indian family only
to the extent that it would return to them the following year. In this,
they were not radically different in kind from other village
lands . . ..
In short, an Indian who "owned" agricultural lands simply had a usu-
fruct right-an exclusive right for the period of ownership to use the land
for agricultural purposes. Ownership interests in all other Indian
lands-the "clam banks, fishing ponds, berry-picking areas, hunting
lands, the great bulk of a village's territory" 2-were even more clearly
limited to usufruct rights and even more distinctly fragmented. Rights to
collect edible wild plants and birchbark for canoes, to catch fish and shell-
fish, to hunt populous roaming animals such as deer and turkeys, and to
set snares and traps for less numerous or more sedentary creatures were
all viewed as separate land use rights and all subject to different use allo-
cation schemes.'"
11. W. CRONON, at 62-63. See W. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 32-33. Cf A. VAUGHAN,
supra note 3, 105-07 (noting some evidence of intertribal land sales, a practice suggesting that land
had an exchange value as well as a use value).
12. W. CRONON, at 63.
13. Cronon's explanation of this flexible land tenure is worth considering in full:
[D]ifferent groups of people could have different claims on the same tract of land depending on
how they used it. Any village member, for instance, had the right to collect edible wild plants,
cut birchbark or chestnut for canoes, or gather sedges for mats, wherever these things could be
found. No special private right inhered in them .... [Tihe same was true of rivers and the
coast: fish and shellfish could generally be taken anywhere, although the nets, harpoons, weirs,
and tackle used to catch them-and hence sometimes the right to use the sites where these
things were installed-might be owned by an individual or a kin group. Indeed, in the case of
extraordinarily plentiful fishing sites-especially major inland waterfalls during the spawning
runs-several villages might gather at a single spot to share the wealth. All of them acknowl-
edged a mutual right to use the site for that specific purpose, even though it might otherwise
lie within a single village's territory. Property rights, in other words, shifted with ecological
use.
Hunting grounds are the most interesting case of this shifting, nonagricultural land tenure.
The ecological habits of different animals were so various that their hunting required a wide
range of techniques, and rights to land use had to differ accordingly. The migratory birds in
the ponds and salt marshes, for example, were so abundant that they could be treated much
like fish: whoever killed them owned them, and hunters could range over any tract of land to
do so, much like the birds themselves .... Likewise, flocks of turkeys and the deer herds
were so abundant in the fall that they were most efficiently hunted by collective drives involv-
ing anywhere from twenty to three hundred men. In such cases, the entire village territory was
the logical hunting region, to which all those involved in the hunt had an equal right.
The same was not true, on the other hand, of hunting that involved the setting of snares or
traps. The animals prey to such techniques were either less numerous, as in the case of winter
deer or moose, or sedentary creatures, like the beaver, which lived in fixed locales. These were
best hunted by spreading the village population over as broad a territory as possible, and so
usufruct rights had to be designed to hold the overlap of trapped areas to a reasonable mini-
mum . . ..
At least for the duration of the winter hunt, the kin group inhabiting a camp probably had a
clear if informal usufruct right to the animals caught in its immediate area. Certainly a man
(or, in the north, his wife) owned the animals captured in the traps he set, though he might
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Thus, an Indian who "owned" land possessed only one or more rights
to use the land for a particular purpose. Some uses, such as use of a
wigwam site, were exclusive uses, while others, such as the right to take
migratory birds from the land, were retained in common by the village
and not allocated to individuals.14 Significantly, some rights that are cur-
rently associated with land ownership, such as the right to amass and hold
land that is in excess of personal needs and the right to transfer for value
unneeded land to another person, were alien to Indian land tenure prac-
tices and cultures (until introduced by the colonists) and were not rights
that belonged to anyone, individually or communally. Recognizing that
there were "rights" held by no one is critical if one is to comprehend fully
the Indian approach to ownership and to appreciate fully their relation-
ship with the natural environment.
In essence, the Indians did not believe that they, or anyone else,
"owned" the land. Like other hunter-gatherer and horticultural groups,
they believed that land was no more subject to ownership than was the
air, water, sky, or the numerous spirits that inhabited the world. Man
merely used the land to enjoy its fruits, and was expected by custom to use
it in a way that preserved its integrity. Man lived on the land but did not
"own" it in the capitalistic sense; man consumed natural resources but
altered his consumptive practices when they threatened nature's abilities
to renew; man used plants and animals to satisfy his need but did not
disrupt his natural environment by importing numerous non-native breeds
and species. Land was useful to the New England Indians for many lim-
have obligations to share which created de facto limits to his claims on them. The collective
activities of a camp thus tended to establish a set of rights which at least temporarily divided
the village territory into hunting areas.
W. CRONON, at 63-64 (citations omitted). See F. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 61-62.
Cronon's discussion of family property rights in hunting grounds, long a disputed topic, raises this
issue to a higher, more sophisticated level by giving such detailed separate examination to the various
rights to take different types of animals during different seasons. The course of this debate is reviewed
in Cronon's bibliographic essay, W. CRONON, at 227-28, and in W. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at
73-75. Most researchers conclude that individual family hunting rights (as opposed to village hunting
rights) were vague and flexible until the arrival of the colonists, when increased trade competition and
declining animal populations made hunting areas more valuable and intensified concern over property
rights in hunting areas. The fur trade spurred the transition to a family hunting territory system.
With this transition, Indians developed a sense of conservation and, at least in some areas, endeavored
to trap the nonmigratory fur-bearing animals on a sustained yield basis. See C. MARTIN, KEEPERS OF
THE GAME 175-76 (1978).
14. Once allocated, however, private property rights were protected by Indian tribes just as they
were by colonial towns. According to historian Francis Jennings:
An Indian who "wandered" into the territory of an alien tribe, or who poached on the hunting
grounds of a fellow tribesman without permission, committed thereby an offense that might be
punished by death. Farmers planted in tracts assigned to them by their chiefs. In the most
literal sense every Indian knew his place on the land and was kept on it by enforced custom.
F. JENNINGS, supra note 3, at 67-71 (citations omitted). See Wallace, supra note 3, at 304, 311-12.
For more general discussions of Indian practices in enforcing village rules, see F. JENNINGS, supra
note 3, at 111; W. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 17-20, 40-42.
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ited and relatively specific purposes, and the Indians devised flexible ways
of allocating to individuals the rights to use tribal lands for these specific
purposes.15
Present-day legal scholars often use the bundle-of-sticks metaphor as a
way to explain that the ownership of a property item at law entails the
possession of a large number of distinct rights to use, conserve, protect,
15. See W. CRONON, at 65-70; N. SALISBURY, supra note 8, at 34-39; W. WASHBURN, supra
note 10, at 11-12, 27, 55-56; Martin, supra note 5, at 11-16. Modern ethnohistorians, while largely
agreeing that Indians were relatively respectful of their physical environment, have reached no con-
sensus on the mental state that motivated specific Indian practices. "World view and the relation of
man to nature," one researcher has asserted, "are perhaps the most difficult and problematical aspects
of ethnohistorical reconstruction." Sturtevant, Animals and Disease in Indian Belief, in INDIANS,
ANIMALS, AND THE FUR TRADE 177, 182 (S. Krech ed. 1981). Indians were certainly not conserva-
tionists in the contemporary sense and were not motivated by any ethical or moral relationship toward
nature. Yet something in the Indian world view and value system led them to exercise restraint and to
avoid excessive depletion of plant and animal populations.
Whether Indians should be admired and studied for their highly developed environmental ethic-an
issue on which Cronon implicitly takes an affirmative stand-has been the subject of much heated
debate. The latest round of scholarly argumentation has asked whether pre-contact Northeastern Indi-
ans refrained from depleting populations of fur-bearing animals because of some ethical restraints on
their conduct or because they lacked sufficient motivation to increase their hunting. It is agreed that
until the beginning of the colonial fur trade, Indians followed practices that maintained high animal
populations but after contact they began killing animals at rates that rapidly depleted animal popula-
tions. This rapid shift in Indian practices seems to suggest that a lack of material motivation rather
than an ethical standard underlay the earlier Indian restraint, and that the advent of colonial markets
provided the stimulus for increased Indian trapping.
In a provocative essay dealing principally with the Micmacs and Ojibwas of eastern Canada, Cal-
vin Martin ties this shift in Indian practices to a breakdown in Indian spiritual beliefs: In the Indian
view, man was linked with spirits that protected fur-bearing animals and other animate and inani-
mate objects. This "spiritual realm was the principal conduit, or channel, through which man was
linked with his physical and natural surroundings." C. MARTIN, supra note 13, at 38. Indian spiri-
tual belief systems included taboos or injunctions against overkilling animals and operated somehow to
keep Indians in rough harmony with their ecosystems. "Land use was therefore not so much a moral
issue for the Indian as it was a technique animated by spiritual-social obligations and understanding."
Id. at 187. For Martin, post-contact Indians were willing to engage in the fur trade only after their
spiritual beliefs had been dramatically interrupted by colonist-induced epidemics, European technol-
ogy, and Christianity. Id. at 61.
Many have found Martin's spiritual thesis unpersuasive and have argued that pre-contact Indians
avoided overkill simply because they enjoyed freedom and leisure, disliked physical overexertion, and,
with resources relatively abundant, had no motivation to overexploit in any area when they could
move elsewhere with higher animal populations and thereby obtain sustenance with less effort. See
INDIANS, ANIMALS, AND THE FUR TRADE, supra. Charles Bishop has gone so far as to argue that
Indians had no concept of limited supplies of goods, no well-defined concept of exploitation, and no
appreciation of the desirability of limiting harvests so as to avoid reducing natural population levels.
Bishop, Northeastern Indian Concepts of Conservation and the Fur Trade: A Critique of Calvin
Martin's Thesis, in INDIANS, ANIMALS AND THE FUR TRADE, supra, at 39, 52-56. For Bishop,
Indian respect for nature, as evidenced by the data uncovered to date, can best be explained as a
consequence of Indian desires to minimize work. Id. at 44-48. Only with the introduction of colonial
trade did Indians have any economic incentive to trap animals more ruthlessly and thoroughly, and
Indians showed no compunction against doing so once this motivation was provided. See id. at 44-51.
Cronon also discredits Martin, W. CRONON, at 91, yet himself offers no coherent thesis on the sudden
willingness of Indians to overkill animals. In his chapter on hunting, he sides with Martin's critics by
citing newly created Indian "needs," id. at 92, 97-98, 105, yet adds undeveloped references to the role
of epidemics, which disrupted Indian "status systems" and thereby "eliminated many of the social
sanctions which had formerly restricted individual accumulation," id. at 98, 161.
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and transfer the item. 6, In a "mature" legal system, it has been argued,
all sticks are present, and they are all possessed by the owner of the prop-
erty unless transferred by him or taken lawfully by the government."
This metaphor, despite its hazards,' 8 helps emphasize the property own-
ership and land use views of the seventeenth-century New England Indi-
ans. Until the colonists arrived the Indians did not aggregate the specific
land use rights into a single bundle and identify with this bundle a new
concept of absolute or full ownership. For these Indians, many sticks were
unknown and fully alien to their system. Other sticks remained owned 'by
the village members communally. Those sticks distributed to individual
village members were handed out individually, and the possession of one
stick relating to a land parcel carried no presumption that other sticks
came with it. In short, the Indians bundled their land use rights in ways
peculiarly suited to their communal, peripatetic lifestyles and their na-
ture-respecting orientations.
II.
The seventeenth-century white colonists conceived of and allocated
property rights in ways distinctly different from their Indian neighbors. In
its early centuries of development, the English common law divided own-
ership rights in land among lords, vassals, and subvassals in a feudal hier-
archy that granted exclusive property rights to no single person. Owner-
ship of a land interest in this feudal system carried responsibilities as well
as rights. "Property in medieval Europe," William Scott has observed,
"meant obligations and conditional ownership, not rights and economic
freedom."' By the early seventeenth century, however, feudalism and the
feudal ideal of mutual personal obligations had largely yielded to a system
of fee simple land ownership and a new property ownership ideology. In
the seventeenth-century mind, each land parcel had only one "owner,"
and the person who "owned" the land necessarily possessed a large bun-
dle of sticks.20
The first English emigrants to Massachusetts tended to recreate in the
New World the land use practices and other traditional, familiar ways of
16. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
17. See Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. Guest ed. 1961).
18. See infra text following note 73.
19. V. SCoTr, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROSPERITY FROM
THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 9 (1977).
20. See J. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM, 1215-1540 (1968); A. SIMPSON, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 163-94 (1961); Donahue, The Future of the
Concept of Property Predicted from its Past, in XXII NOMOS: PROPERTY 28-42; Lemon, Spatial
Order: Households in Local Communities and Regions, in COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA 86, 87-88
(J. Greene & J. Pole eds. 1984).
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life that they had left behind in English villages. Many settlers arrived
with intentions to reform traditional legal structures, but these reforming
impulses were overpowered by the settlers' cultural baggage. As a result,
the initial settlements in colonial Massachusetts took on the appearance of
rural English farm and coastal communities.2 ' The distribution of land to
residents in the first New England towns, as well as the regulation of the
uses of town lands, reflected the primacy of communal, noneconomic
goals. In an effort to maintain godly communities, town fathers distributed
town lands only to immigrants who passed moral and religious tests. To
maintain solidarity, towns generally prohibited land ownership by other
than town residents and required town approval of land sales.22 Deference
to social betters was evident in nearly all aspects of town and church life.
Land distributions reflected this deference as towns allocated new lands
not in equal increments per capita or per family but according to the
substantial social class variations that existed among town residents.
2 3
Land ownership thus played a vital communal role in supporting what
was perceived as the natural social structure.
Town land distributions also reflected the considerable variety in land
use practices that existed in England, practices that colonists carried with
them to the New World. In some English villages individual farmers
owned small strips scattered over large village fields that were tilled com-
munally by the village farmers; in other villages, where the enclosure
movement had begun earlier, farmers held their lands in the form of sin-
gle, enclosed farms that were farmed individually. In some areas land had
a well-recognized market value and was regularly bought and sold; in
other areas, transfers for value were rare and land values were less influ-
21. See D. ALLEN, IN ENGLISH WAYS: THE MOVEMENT OF SOCIETIES AND THE TRANSFERRAL
OF ENGLISH LOCAL LAW AND CUSTOM TO MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
(1981); D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 3-31 (1958); D. KONIG, LAW
AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS 3-4, 18 (1979); K. LOCKRIDGE, A NEw ENGLAND
TOWN: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS xiii, 3-22 (1970); S. POWELL, PURITAN VILLAGE: THE FOR-
MATION OF A NEW ENGLAND TOWN 139-46 (1963); Breen, Creative Adaptations: Peoples and
Cultures, in COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA, supra note 20, at 195, 207; Campbell, Social Origins of
Some Early Americans, in SEVENTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 63
(J. Smith ed. 1959).
22. See D. ALLEN, supra note 21, passim; P. GREVEN, FOUR GENERATIONS 41-51, 62-64
(1970); D. KONIG, supra note 21, at 29-30; K. LOCKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 3-22; S. POWELL,
supra note 21, passim. But see S. INNES, at 44-45, 123-25 (noting unusual disinclination in Spring-
field to impose economic restraints to maintain social cohesion).
23. Land distributions, generally made free of charge, were not made in equal increments per
capita or per family. Towns allocated farm land and pasturage rights so as to maintain the substantial
social class variations that existed among the town residents. Although the towns' policies varied con-
siderably, the typical practice was to award larger, better-situated tracts to families that were larger in
size (including servants) and higher in social status. Land allocations thus recognized and perpetuated
the existing social and economic distinctions among the early town families. See D. ALLEN, supra note
21, passim; P. GREVEN, supra note 22, at 41-51; S. INNE, at 45; K. LOCKRIDGE, supra note 21, at
10-12; S. POWELL, supra note 21, at 9-11, 83, 136.
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enced by proximity to market.2 Some colonial towns, like Sudbury and
Andover, Massachusetts, adopted open-field farming techniques by divid-
ing town lands into several large fields and allocating to each town family
one or more discrete strips in each of the fields and by setting aside sub-
stantial areas as communal pasturages and woodlots. Farming decisions in
these open-field towns were commonly made by the farmers as a group.
Because the landholdings of each farmer in open-field towns were widely
scattered, farm families naturally lived together in villages, much like
their Indian neighbors, rather than dispersed upon individual farms.2 5
Most towns adopted enclosed-field farming practices and allocated to
each family one or a small number of larger, more isolated land tracts.
Farmers in such towns tilled their lands separately and tended to share
fewer items of personal property. Even towns that followed this enclosed-
farm practice, however, often tried to force residents to live in a single
village and in close proximity to the local church. In an effort to build
close-knit, neighborly communities and to preserve religious and social
solidarity, home building was restricted to specified geographic areas near
the town centers, even though farm lands, and hence the work sites of
town residents, might be far distant. The economic benefits of living closer"
to farm work sites (and farther from watchful, critical neighbors), how-
ever, encouraged families to move onto their separate farms. Within a few
decades of settlement, the enclosed-farm towns were characterized by a
broad dispersion of the farm families. 6
Not all land was allocated to families, however. Many towns allocated
to the first settlers only a small portion of the total town chartered lands
and reserved most lands for later distribution as needs dictated, thus re-
taining the town's power to control development for decades. Some areas
were held as commons with specific, limited rights to use the commons
allocated to families in the same manner (and often at the same time) as
private lands were allocated. Other areas were simply surplus lands, gen-
erally more distant from the town center, retained to accommodate later
town expansion and owned and managed in the interim by town
governments.27
24. See D. ALLEN, supra note 21, passim; S. POWELL, supra note 21, passim.
25. See D. ALLEN, supra note 21, passim; W. CRONON, at 72-74; P. GREVEN, supra note 22 (for
Andover); S. INNES, at 44-45, 123-25; K. LOCKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 12-14; S. POWELL, supra
note 21, passim (for Sudbury).
26. See D. ALLEN, supra note 21; J. DEMOS, A LrrrLE COMMONWEALTH 9-12 (1970); P.
GREVEN, supra note 22, at 51-61; S. INNEs, at 45-47; S. POWELL, supra note 21, at 95, 118-38;
Lemon, supra note 20, at 92-95; see also Kelly, "In dispers'd Country Plantations": Settlement
Patterns in Seventeenth-Century Surry County, Virginia, in THE CHESAPEAKE IN THE SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTuRY 183 (T. Tate & D. Ammerman eds. 1979) (noting similar evidence of dispersed
settlement patterns in early Virginia).
27. See D. ALLEN, supra note 21; K. LOCKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 12-13; S. POWELL, supra
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The property ownership ideas and land use practices that were brought
to New England by the first colonists underwent considerable change in
the seventeenth century, change that reflected, for the most part, a clear
shift toward increasing economic individualism. One change then occur-
ring in the Anglo-American world was in the prevailing theoretical justifi-
cation for private property. 28 For centuries prior to the colonizing of New
England, theorists had debated whether private property ownership was a
natural right existing independent of government action or whether it was
an artificial, human construct instituted by governments and hence subject
to governmental infringement." By the seventeenth century, the rising
mercantile class and the rural landed gentry saw as their greatest practical
need the curtailment of government power over private property. After its
articulation in late century, John Locke's labor theory of property, which
argued that man had a natural right to the visible products of his labor,
was especially popular in England since it seemed to justify resistance to
governmental interference with private property.30 When the New Eng-
land character was first established in the 1630's, this shift to natural
rights theories of property ownership was not yet far advanced in Eng-
land. The view that private property was an innate natural right re-
mained subordinate to the Puritan view that town governments had full
power to regulate man's economic activities. But there nonetheless existed
among the early settlers a growing sense that property rights were to some
extent God-given human rights that no government could abolish. Not
surprisingly, as natural rights sentiments grew, colonists became increas-
ingly resistant to governmental efforts to fetter the use and development
options of individual land owners."1
As colonists gradually embraced this natural rights justification for eco-
nomic individualism, they came to view land and other natural resources
as commodities whose value was determined primarily if not exclusively
by the market. The arriving New England colonists brought with them a
belief that nature and its bounty existed solely to serve man. Land and the
resources of nature were commodities that man could own and alter, con-
sume, or even destroy at will to satisfy his desires. Indeed, land was not
valuable unless it was altered and tamed: Wilderness was simply a waste-
note 21, at 93-97.
28. See R. SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 124-61 (1951); W.
SCOTT, supra note 19, at 5-23 (1977); Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U.
PA. L. REV. 691, 713-31 (1938).
29. For an excellent summary of medieval and early modern conceptions of property, see R.
SCHLATrER, supra note 28.
30. For a discussion of Locke's theories, see L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC
FOUNDATIONS 32-43 (1977); R. SCHLATTER, supra note 28, at 151-61.
31. See W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 10-17; Philbrick, supra note 28, at 708-14.
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land until subdued by the axe and subjected to human control. Lands that
Indians left unfenced and wandered upon for occasional hunting were, in
the colonists' view, largely unused and wasted. s2
This consumptive orientation toward nature, already pronounced in the
minds of the first settlers, continued to strengthen as the colonial era
progressed. Colonists viewed an item's monetary worth in the market as a
prime, if not the prime, determinant of its inherent value. Increasingly,
land was valued not just for its produce but for the money it could bring
upon sale. The colonists began to divide elements of nature into two cate-
gories: those possessing and those lacking market value, treating as worth-
less those elements lacking value in the market. To the colonial mind,
nature was no longer a coherent, interrelated environment. Plants, ani-
mals, and minerals that Indian practices respected as part of the scheme of
nature were ignored and carelessly destroyed by colonists because they
lacked "value" in market terms.3"
A colonial landowner could realize fully the exchange value of his land
only if he was free to sell to the highest buyer and to convey to the buyer
the right to use the land free of use restrictions. Not surprisingly, then,
land-owning colonists began to question the limitations placed on their
land use rights, including communal land use practices, shared ownership
rights, and other town practices that controlled land use in furtherance of
noneconomic ends. Landowners also resisted open-field farming practices,
so open-field towns gradually yielded during the seventeenth-century to
farmer demands to consolidate their various separate parcels and to en-
close them as discrete, individually managed farms. Landowners gained
the right to move onto farms distant from town centers and to sell their
lands free of ownership restraints and moral screening tests for new resi-
dents. Step by step, the landowner's bundle of land use rights grew larger,
a development very much a part of a larger colonial and western trend
toward individualism and economic liberty."
Paradoxically, as landowners placed substantial weight on the market
value of land and successfully resisted land use restraints, they devalued
their land by continuing to employ the wasteful practices that had seemed
appropriate during the first years of settlement. Plentiful land in early
32. See W. CRONON, at 75; R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 23-43 (3d ed.
1982).
33. See W. CRONON, at 73-79, 165-70; D. KONIG, supra note 21, at 67-68; K. LOCKRIDGE,
supra note 21, at 145-51; Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?-The Need for a New
Conceptual Basis for Land Use Theory, 15 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 759, 761 (1974).
34. See D. ALLEN, supra note 21, passim; J. DEMOS, supra note 26, at 11-12, 188; K.
LOCKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 80-85, 94-100; S. POWELL, supra note 21, at 118-39; Lemon, supra
note 20, at 92-95; cf. A. MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY,
PROPERTY, AND SOCIAL TRANSITION (1978) (noting evidence of economic individualism centuries
earlier in England).
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New England stimulated appetites for land acquisition. As a result, aver-
age landholdings in early New England were substantially larger than
corresponding landholdings in England. The availability of land coupled
with shortages in farm laborers encouraged landowners to use agricultural
practices that were labor saving and land wasting, an attitude of waste
that remained in place even as land scarcities developed in the earliest-
settled farm communities."5
The early New England system of land use and property ownership
adhered to by early New England colonists thus differed in several signifi-
cant ways from the practices of the neighboring Indians. By the end of the
seventeenth century, the colonial landowner possessed nearly exclusive
rights to use his land for all purposes and to exclude and halt all other
uses and users. Land use rights that were viewed as discrete by the Indi-
ans (and therefore allocated individually) were aggregated into a single
bundle by the colonists and awarded to a single "owner" of the land. In
comparison to the more refined, complex Algonquian system of allocating
land use rights, the New England approach was characterized chiefly by
an extraordinary aggregation of land use rights in one individual. 36
A s~cond distinction between the two systems appears in their respective
views of land valuation. The Indian had no real concept of the value of
land apart from its productiveness to the holder. Land had no recogniza-
ble market, transfer or rental value. To the Indian, land was owned only
to the extent it was needed at the time; the idea of hoarding land for use
years or decades later made little sense. Under the colonial system, how-
ever, a family could own lands that it was not using and that were even in
excess of its contemplated needs. The colonists also believed, contrary to
Indian practices, that land used by one family might be owned by another,
with some economic rent due by the tenant to the landlord.3 7
The permanence of the individual colonial land ownership rights distin-
guished them in a third substantial way from the corresponding Indian
rights. Indian rights, limited as they were to the right to make a specific
35. See W. CRONON, at 165-70. As Cronon indicates, the increasing clamor for unrestrained land
use rights developed hand-in-hand with wasteful land use practices. See also P. GREVEN, supra note
22, at 65-68 (evidence of excessive landholdings in Andover, Massachusetts); K. LOCxRIDGE, supra
note 21, at 155-57 (evidence of the continuation of wasteful agricultural practices in Dedham, Massa-
chusetts). For a view of the even more consumptive Virginia attitude toward nature and its presumed
never-ending bounty, see T. BREEN, PURITANS AND ADVENTURERS: CHANGE AND PERSPECTIVE IN
EARLY AMERICA 164-96 (1980).
36. See D. ALLEN, supra note 21, passim; W. CRONON, at 73, 76-78; P. GREVEN, supra note 22,
at 51-61.
37. Indians did retain ownership rights in lands that were used only part of the year, and to this
extent did comprehend ownership of rights in lands not in immediate use. See supra pp. 719-21.
Tribes did recognize intertribal transfer of sovereignty over land, which is a form of transfer for value,
yet this should best be viewed, as Cronon urges, as "more a diplomatic exchange than an economic
one." W. CRONON, at 61.
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and personal use of the land, naturally ended when the land was no
longer useful to the owner for that specific purpose. Colonists, by compar-
ison, believed in permanent settlements and viewed permanence as a char-
acteristic of land ownership rights.3" The two cultures differed further in
the respect they showed for the natural environment. Indian land practices
contemplated and tolerated less interference with the ecosystem; colonial
agricultural practices, on the contrary, reflected a view of plants, animals,
and minerals as individual commodities that were not part of an interre-
lated ecosystem. Native wild animals were driven out by the colonists and
replaced with non-native domestic ones; land was stripped bare and
planted with a single crop species, often a non-native one; trees and min-
erals were taken by the colonists with no thought of replacement or re-
plenishment. In comparison to the neighboring Indians, the colonists were
far more willing to attack and manipulate the land and its resident plant
and animal species in order to suit human needs."
III.
Cronon's engaging history describes the land use conflict between Indi-
ans and colonists in early America. Innes, in his tale of seventeenth-
century Springfield, explores a subsequent conflict among the colonists
themselves-a conflict that raises what is perhaps the fundamental land
use question: Do land use decisions so directly affect the community wel-
fare, are land and community so directly linked, that land use decisions in
an advanced, human society must necessarily be based on social, commu-
nal considerations as well as on economic ones? Innes raises this issue in
an intriguing, indirect way by describing the decline of one family's social
and political influence, a decline caused in large part by a growing senti-
ment in seventeenth-century Springfield that land and community should
be separate decisional spheres.
Springfield, Massachusetts, established as a trading post on the
Connecticut River in the 1630's on the then-frontier fringe of colonial
civilization, was dominated by commercial concerns in its first century to a
degree uncharacteristic of the more religious, quasi-feudal farming towns
38. See W. CRONON, at 53, 65-69, 166-69; supra pp. 720-21.
39. See W. CRONON, at 108-70.
Ethnohistorians have reached no consensus on the Indians' view or mental attitude toward nature.
See supra note 15. "Anthropologists generally regard the pre-Columbian North American Indian as
having been a sensitive member of his environment, an individual who merged 'himself sympatheti-
cally into the world of living and even non-living things.' C. MARTIN, supra note 13, at 33 (citation
omitted). The reasons for this sensitivity and sympathy, however, are not clear. As Cronon demon-
strates, Indian practices in comparison to colonial practices were much less disruptive of natural eco-
systems. It was thus principally in their actions rather than through articulated world views that
Indians demonstrated a respect for nature and ecosystem balances.
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of Puritan New England. At the apogee of the Springfield economy stood
the towering figure of William Pynchon, town founder, principal land-
owner, commercial leader, and landlord or employer of most of the town
breadwinners. In their extensive, diverse economic endeavors throughout
western Massachusetts, William Pynchon and his son John embraced
sooner and more fully than their neighbors the emerging ideology of eco-
nomic individualism. The Pynchons were at the forefront of the ongoing
changes in economic practices and thought. Yet the Pynchon family was
much more than an economic power. William Pynchon held all important
civil and judicial power and oversaw Springfield in its early years "much
like an English manorial lord."4° By 1665, John Pynchon "held virtually
every significant leadership position. He was simultaneously magistrate,
judge of the country court, permanent moderator of the town meeting, and
captain of the militia." 1 The Pynchon mansion dominated Springfield ar-
chitecture, standing in stark contrast to the modest dwellings of most
villagers.42
Had he lived a few centuries earlier, William Pynchon undoubtedly
would have boasted a noble title and would have enjoyed as lord the fealty
and loyalty of his economic and social subordinates-his vassals. Had he
lived in the nineteenth century, Pynchon would have been viewed as the
town's leading businessman, an entrepreneurial magnate whose influence
rested openly and entirely on his economic power. Pynchon lived, how-
ever, in the seventeenth century, which was a time of transition in colonial
America from feudalism to capitalism, a period referred to by William
Scott as the age of "socialized individualism."4 3 This societal transition
included, as one of its chief elements, a splitting apart of the social and
economic spheres of life. In earlier feudal times, land ownership invaria-
bly conferred on the landowner substantial political and social privileges.
In the emerging capitalist age, however, these privileges were no longer an
assumed aspect of land ownership. In nineteenth-century capitalist society,
the large property owner received from his economic subordinates only his
contractual dues. Their loyalty, respect, and public support, once auto-
matically given to the large landowner of social and political dominance,
now had to be separately acquired.44
40. S. INNES, at xix.
41. Id. A wealth of information on the Pynchons' judicial activities is set forth in the pioneering
COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS (1629-1702): THE PYNCHON COURT RECORD
(J. Smith ed. 1961).
42. S. INNES, at 18.
43. W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 5-23.
44. See R. SCHLATTER, supra note 28, at 63-76; Philbrick, supra note 28, at 708-14. On the
medieval equation of land ownership and social control, see C. ERICKSON, THE MEDIEVAL VISION
104-23 (1976).
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In telling the tale of the Pynchons, Innes describes a clash between fun-
damentally conflicting views of the social roles of private property. The
Pynchons attempted to use their massive property holdings in western
Massachusetts to command the social respect and political support of their
economic subordinates. They succeeded in this goal for several decades,
Innes tells us, by forming "patron-client" ties with many of their tenants
and employees and by controlling, with their client support, the economic
and political lives of most residents of western Massachusetts. These cli-
ents of the Pynchons went beyond their contractual duties, supporting and
respecting the Pynchons as the leaders of Springfield society. The
Pynchons in return favored them in economic matters and, when feasible,
protected them from the harsh vicissitudes of life on the early American
frontier. "As patron, John Pynchon exchanged the fruits of his status,
power, influence, and authority for the loyalty and political support of the
client. ' '4
5
The patron-client relationship, Innes contends, was a transitional phase
from the master-servant relationship of the manorial system to the em-
ployer-employee relationship of the capitalist economy:
The patron-client relationship harkened back to the manor by its
emphasis on person-to-person ties, but even more it anticipated the
triumph of contractualism and the cash nexus by its preeminently
economic nature. Patron-client ties occupied the middle ground be-
tween feudalism and capitalism, and they allowed the peasants of the
sixteenth century to become the wage-earners of the eighteenth.46
While representing an economic advancement over the manorial economy,
the Pynchon patron-client approach was nonetheless inconsistent with the
ascending spirit of economic individualism. As Innes relates, "the future
would belong to the market, not the manor."4
As the seventeenth century progressed, the common man increasingly
resisted the idea that a property owner had as one of his rights of owner-
ship the right to dominate the noneconomic lives of those who lived under
45. S. INNES, at 40. Clients owed their loyalty to the Pynchons, but received in return distinctly
favorable treatment:
Pynchon often ignored contractual deadlines if the client found himself unable to meet them.
Mortgages were not foreclosed, lands and housing were not seized, debts were not called on the
day or even the month or year of maturity. Laborers, too, were hired when Pynchon had no
genuine need or desire to take them on. Likewise, he seldom pursued his technical legal rights
as a creditor, landlord, or employer in cases relating to clients. The strength of the particular
patron-client bond determined whether Pynchon would modify, renegotiate, or postpone collec-
tion of debts. For the same reasons, some renters were able to secure significantly better terms
than others.
46. Id. at 18.
47. Id. at 42.
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or around his economic umbrella. This development tracked the similar
growing resistance to town land use restraints. Town leaders like the
Pynchons drew their strength from a mentality that mixed together land
and community. This mentality eventually yielded to the view that land
was simply an economic commodity with land use issues properly resolved
by the land owner alone based solely on factors of economic efficiency.
The Pynchons based their ascendancy as patrons on their immense prop-
erty holdings. As property and economic activity gradually became a
sphere of human activity distinct from social and political spheres, the
Pynchon family's political and social dominance eroded, and resistance to
the family mounted. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Pynchons
as landowners could no longer demand the social and political deference
that once came to them naturally. Deference and fealty had to be earned,
and the Pynchons in the eighteenth century were largely unable to earn
it.48
This separation between economic power on the one hand, and social
and political power on the other, was also responsible for the loss by town
governments of their power to control land use and land ownership in
furtherance of social and political goals. This loss of control meant an
increase in absentee land ownership, a disturbing development to town
leaders who equated land ownership with social participation. For these
tradition-minded townsmen, David Konig has observed, "Nonresident
ownership of land depersonalized it and destroyed the ancient equation of
land tenure with membership in the community. . . .Physically removed
from the town, [nonresidents] were unfamiliar with the community's un-
written customs and relationships." Occasionally, therefore, they were
"less reluctant to pursue material gain at the expense of local harmony. '49
The entrepreneurial spirit that emerged in seventeenth-century
Springfield, with its emphasis on individual liberties, displaced the
Pynchons' quasi-feudal view of property ownership. Yet the Pynchon
property view, based as it was on an organic feudal vision, had in many
ways benefited Springfield's less powerful residents. The Pynchons had
had responsibilities as well as rights; they enjoyed a cultural and political
dominance over town members, but were constrained to use their property
to benefit their clients and their community-not only themselves. As the
Pynchons lost the noneconomic rights that once attached to their land
holdings, they gained the right to use their property to exploit without
restraint those who were dependent upon it.
This separation of land from community marked the final demise of the
48. See S. INNES, at 151-84.
49. D. KONIG, supra note 21, at 67-68.
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feudal property scheme of mutual obligations, a demise that produced
costs as well as benefits. "The disappearance of any long established social
system," wrote Francis Philbrick in 1938, "must involve some losses. And
so, in the case of feudalism it is regrettable that there could not have been
preserved the idea that all property was held subject to the performance of
duties-not a few of them public."5
IV.
The seventeenth century in New England was a time of conflict in
man-land ideologies, both between the colonial and Indian cultures and
within the colonial settlements themselves. These conflicts, while interest-
ing in their historical settings, are perhaps of greater interest because of
their similarities to contemporary land use and environmental controver-
sies. By bringing these early conflicts to life, Innes' and Cronon's histori-
cal studies highlight and add perspective to the issues facing today's land
use planners and property theorists.
In seventeenth-century New England, Indian land use practices openly
conflicted with and were inexorably displaced by the more aggressive colo-
nial system, with its larger bundle of landowner rights, its respect and
protections for land exchange value, its permanent ownership rights, and
its consumptive attitude toward nature. Within the colonial system, pri-
vate landowners seeking greater land use rights successfully tangled with
those who sought to preserve the older views that linked together land and
community. The gradual ascendancy of economic individualism undercut
town efforts to restrict property ownership and land use practices in fur-
therance of communal, noneconomic goals. Unlike their Indian neighbors,
the colonists viewed elements of nature as discrete, disconnected commodi-
ties and treated as valuable only those resources of nature that possessed
monetary value in the market place. Declining restraints on land transfers
meant that landowners were better able to achieve the highest market ex-
change values of their land. Commodities lacking market value were af-
forded little respect, and landowners assumed full rights to alter and dis-
rupt at will the natural New England ecosystems. The desirability of
continued common resource ownership was also questioned. With the sep-
aration of land and community, common resource ownership, a marked
feature of many New England towns in the first years of settlement,
quickly passed from the scene as a major alternative to individual private
land ownership.
In the twentieth century, American society has lost much of the enthu-
siasm for unrestrained economic individualism that was such a motivating
50. Philbrick, supra note 28, at 710 (citation omitted).
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ideology three centuries ago. Contemporary society has openly shifted
weight from economic development to individual rights and communal
values and has defined the general welfare in terms that place increasing
weight on factors that conflict with economic development. More and
more, society is questioning the wisdom of a property system that affords
a landowner a complete or nearly complete bundle of ownership rights
while imposing few corresponding burdens and reserving few rights for
society as a whole.
In light of this contemporary questioning of the values first embraced in
America in the seventeenth century, it is perhaps particularly worthwhile
to consider the losing man-land ideologies of the seventeenth century--
those of the Algonquians and of the colonial supporters of a waning man-
land ideology that linked land and community. The study of these earlier
theories of property raises questions of contemporary significance concern-
ing property ownership and land use. For example, should an owner have
as one of his rights of ownership the right to destroy or consume limited
natural resources? Should land be simply an economic commodity owned
by man, or should man's rights be tempered by the Algonquian recogni-
tion that man is a part of nature and has ethical responsibilities to his
environment? Should society more openly embrace a broader view of
value that also considers land as "used," and perhaps best used, when it is
left in its natural, undeveloped condition? Perhaps the most provocative
issue raised by the Algonquian approach to land use is the old issue of the
"tragedy of the commons," the "tragedy" of resource exhaustion that
comes with unrestrained public use of a limited communal resource."
Should society react to this problem not by carving the resource into sepa-
rately owned parcels as it has done for centuries, but by allocating usu-
fruct interests to individuals while retaining ultimate public ownership of
the resource? That is, should land use rights be unbundled in such a way
that landowners possess only particular land use rights rather than ulti-
mate dominion over the land?
The experiences of the Pynchons and the losing advocates of colonial
town planning raise still other ideological issues. Should society give up its
paradigm of unrestrained ownership and adopt instead the view that own-
ership rights are somehow linked with duties to the community? Should
private property be subject to public control, not simply when a particular
proposed land use activity is a nuisance, but whenever the public wants a
tract of land used in a way that differs from the individual "owner's"
personal desires?
Historical studies like these works by Cronon and Innes provide the
51. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SciEcE 1243 (1968).
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stimulus to pursue these lines of inquiry. They shed light, for example, on
current debates over the preservation and protection of lands and struc-
tures that produce few current monetary benefits. American law now pro-
tects wilderness areas and endangered species, 2 places considerable
weight on aesthetic values in zoning and nuisance controversies, 3 and
considers land "in use" when it is set aside under land use plans as "open
space."'54 These diverse current steps toward preservation reflect a new
realization that all elements of nature possess value.55 Readers of Cro-
non's tale who embrace this new, broader definition of value will admire
the restraint toward natural ecosystems exhibited by the Algonquian
tribes. Indeed, the Algonquian tribes, criticized by the colonists for failing
to make real use of their land under the then-prevailing consumptive Eu-
ropean ideology, should perhaps instead now be commended for a broad if
unarticulated understanding of the many ways that land can be used.
These historical studies also provide a perspective on current debates
over the nature and extent of the land use rights possessed by a land-
owner. Recent takings decisions suggest that a landowner has no legally
protected right to receive in the market place his land's highest market
value; his right is only the right to make some reasonable use of the prop-
erty.56 Recent legal developments have also deprived landowners of some
of the sticks in their bundle of land use rights-including the right to
control overhead air spaces not being reasonably used;57 the right to ap-
propriate water from beneath the land surface or from adjoining surface
streams;"8 the right under zoning regulations to develop land or to change
land uses; and, to an extent, even the right to exclude the public from
52. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287, 1531-1543 (1982) (endangered species and wild and scenic
rivers); id. §§ 1131, 1133 (.wilderness areas); id. §§ 1, 3 (national parks); G. COGGINS & C. WILKIN-
SON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 724-839 (1981); Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1970); Note, Wilderness Management and
the Multiple-Use Mandate, 59 MINN. L. REv. 155 (1974).
53. Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority ofJurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic
Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REv. 125 (1980); Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Refor-
mulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 361-81 (1982).
54. OPEN SPACE AND THE LAW (F. Herring ed. 1965); Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regu-
lation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1972).
55. Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1396-1402
(1981).
56. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (substantial reduction in land value
caused by maximum density zoning not a taking); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (denial of right to develop overhead air space not a taking); Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (denial of right to fill and develop wetlands not a
taking).
57. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946); J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 392-96 (2d ed. 1975).
58. See, e.g., Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 638 P.2d 1324 (1981),
appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982); Wheeler, The Right to Use Groundwater in Arizona After
Chino Valley II and Cherry v. Steiner, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 473, 484-87 (1983).
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private property.59 The Algonquian land use approach described by Cro-
non suggests by its example that real flexibility is possible in distributing
land use rights and in limiting the bundle of rights held by the principal
"cowner."
Still other contemporary legal developments reflect the centrality and
continuing vitality of seventeenth-century issues and conflicts. Contempo-
rary observers60 have asked whether landowners' private rights create cor-
responding duties owed to the community. Owners of ecologically sensitive
lands such as wetlands" and owners of historic buildings such as the
Penn Central Terminal 62 have been burdened with duties to maintain and
preserve their "private" property on the theory that at least certain prop-
erty, even when in private hands, is a public asset that the owner must
preserve for the benefit of the larger community and future generations.
Legal scholars synthesizing these emerging landowner duties have viewed
land as a resource "affected with a public interest.'1 63 This theory of land
ownership, like the feudal scheme, would routinely impose legal duties on
landowners to correspond with their legal rights. 4 Others have argued
from this evidence that a landowner's legal powers should entail not
dominion over land but simply usufructory land rights with no right to
waste land to the detriment of later users.6 5
59. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (state by constitutional
provision can compel private shopping center to allow political solicitors); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297,
277 A.2d 369 (1971) (conduct of public interest attorney seeking to enter farm to see migrant workers
beyond reach of trespass statute). But see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982) (private landlord not required to accept cable television equipment on property absent
condemnation). For a general discussion of restraints on the right to exclude, see C. DONAHUE, T.
KAUPER, P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 254-80 (2d ed. 1983).
60. W. BERRY, THE GIFT OF GOOD LAND 267-81 (1981); W. BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF
AMERICA: CULTURE AND AGRICULTURE 7 (1977); W. JACKSON, NEW RooTS FOR AGRICULTURE
96-113 (1980); Caldwell, Politics and Public Land Policy, in AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS: POLITICS,
ECONOMICS & ADMINISTRATION 297-329 (H. Nathan ed. 1972); Caldwell, supra note 33, at
759-61; Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983). For
an earlier, elegant recitation of the view that land ownership should carry communal obligations, see
E.B. WHITE, ONE MAN'S MEAT 266-67 (Harper & Row ed. 1982). For a thoughtful socialist per-
spective on the need to limit the powers of the owner of property in order to foster communal values,
see Kohak, Possessing, Owning, Belonging, in BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 155-71 (I. Howe ed.
1982).
61. Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 72 Mass. 1303, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972) (restric-
tion on development of flood plain area), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Sibson v. State, 115
N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975) (restriction on filling salt marsh); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.
2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (required maintenance of wetlands without development). But see
MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals, 369 Mass. 512, 340 N.E.2d 487 (1976) (public desire to maintain
marshland in natural state not grounds for denying fill permit). See Large, This Land is Whose
Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039.
62. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (required main-
tenance of facade of railroad terminal).
63. Babcock & Feurer, Land as a Commodity "Affected with a Public Interest," 52 WASH. L.
REV. 289 (1977).
64. Id.
65. See Caldwell, supra note 33.
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Land Use
Also at issue in the twentieth century, as in the seventeenth, is the ques-
tion of communal land ownership. To a marked degree, communal own-
ership has regained adherents, as evidenced by resource set-asides varying
from large wilderness areas66 to common open spaces in Planned Unit
Developments,67 by laws asserting public ownership over water, 8 wild-
life,6" and other resources previously viewed as unowned and available for
capture,70 and by the 1976 formal decision by Congress to reverse its
theretofore existing policy in favor of disposing of the 700-million-acre
landholdings of the federal government and to replace it with a policy of
long-term retention and management in the public interest.71
Viable property systems come in many varieties with no single form of
property ownership essential for a society to thrive. By detailing the dif-
ferent blends and variations in property systems that have suited the spe-
cial needs of particular peoples in different settings, historical studies such
as Changes in the Land and Labor in a New Land broaden property
ownership discussions beyond the polarities of public ownership and pure
individual ownership. They facilitate reexamination of paradigms and
principles of property ownership that have long served as the building
blocks of property thought. 2
66. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1134 (1982).
67. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ch. 32 (1981) (planned unit
developments).
68. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913) ("[Tjhat the running water in
a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable."). Most Western states,
which follow prior appropriation theories of water allocation, allow appropriations of water only after
issuance of a permit and upon a showing that the proposed use will be beneficial. See 5 R. POWELL &
P. ROHAN, supra note 67, at 449-64; see also Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A
Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 554-76 (1983) (discussing growing restraints
on landowner water rights in Eastern states).
69. N.Y. Environmental Conserv. Law § 11-0105 (1973) (wildlife).
70. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982) (federal lands management); G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON,
supra note 52, at 43-143. Communal ownership of other types of property also seems on the rise. See,
e.g., Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL.
L. REV. 633, 690-95 (predicting continuation of current trend in increased employee ownership of
factories).
71. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 102, 90 Stat. 2743,
2744 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982)).
72. For reasons not easy to identify, American legal historians have shown comparatively little
interest in the colonial era, an indisposition bemoaned recently by Stanley Katz, one of the leading
historians of law in early America. See Katz, The Problem of a Colonial Legal History, in COLONIAL
BRITISH AMERICA, supra note 20, at 457, 467-77. Katz observes that several recent, major studies of
nineteenth-century legal developments have evidenced an erroneous and regrettable belief "that colo-
nial law is to be either ignored or caricatured as stable, unchanging, and in the end uninteresting." Id.
at 473. Grant Gilmore saw little relevance to the colonial period: "The law of the primitive agricul-
tural settlements which were painfully hacked from the wilderness in the seventeenth century...
had no more relevance to the law of our own industrialized society than the law of the Sioux or the
Cheyennes." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 8 (1977). Katz' reaction was perhaps
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These studies and other recent historical works shed a new and contra-
dicting light on writings of early legal scholars who based influential
property theories on assumptions about "natural" forms of property own-
ership and "natural" progressions in the development of property rights.
They challenge, for example, the conclusions of Blackstone, who based his
property theories on the erroneous assumption that private property was
the natural form of ownership in early societies." They undermine as
well the developmental theories of Sir Henry Maine and other
nineteenth-century exponents of the historical school of property who con-
cluded from the then-available data that primitive communal ownership
evolved naturally with civilization into the more "advanced" mode of pri-
vate property.74 As contemporary historians and anthropologists disprove
these assumptions about the natural force of unrestrained private owner-
ship, contemporary legal scholars would do well to reexamine the prop-
erty law decisions and rules so heavily based upon them.
The special comparative lens of the seventeenth century enables us to
focus more clearly, and critically, on three models of property ownership
that have long defined and restrained discussions of property law. One
model suggests that the justification, if not the origin, of private landhold-
ings lies in the "tragedy of the commons," the tragedy of overuse and
declining productivity that occurs when a scarce natural resource like a
predictable: "The colonial historian hardly knows where to begin in dealing with such nonsense."
Katz, supra, at 472. On the implications of the label "primitive," see W. WASHBURN, supra note 10,
at xvii-xviii.
73. Blackstone's historical analysis of property is set forth in 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*2-14. For Blackstone, the property owner's rights of ownership were necessarily considerable.
Blackstone defined the right of property as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individ-
ual in the universe." 2 Id. at *2. Blackstone largely adhered to the natural rights theory of property
ownership, yet at several points used language suggesting that property rights are derived from civil
society. See, e.g., 1 id. at *299 (asserting that property forfeiture for criminal conduct is justified
because property is a civil right conferred by society); 2 id. at *12 (asserting that the right to inherit is
a political right since the decedent's ownership itself was a civil rather than a natural right); see also
D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 167 (1941) ("Some of the most obscure--
one might say mystical-passages in the Commentaries are the descriptions of the right of property.").
For critical discussions of Blackstone's historical analysis of property, see R. SCHLATTER, supra note
28, at 164-71; D. BOORSTIN, supra, at 167-86. See also K. NEWMAN, LAW AND ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PREINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 7 (1983) (identifying the mid-
nineteenth century as the birth of legal history and viewing earlier scholarly analyses of the founda-
tions of modern law as philosophic rather than historic). For a more recent example of an attempt to
support conclusions on property ownership and property use from incomplete historical data on prim-
itive societies, see Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Right, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967). On
the uses of history by the Supreme Court over the years, see C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
74. See R. SCHLATTER, supra note 28, at 261-69; H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW ch. VII (London
1861); H. MAINE, LECTURES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 98-118 (H. Holt & Co.
ed. 1888); H. MAINE, VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST 224-30 (3d ed. 1876) (1st
ed. London 1871); see also Hallowell, The Nature and Function of Property as a Social Institution, I
J. LEGAL & POL. SOC. 115, 123 (1943).
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pasture is owned communally and open to unrestrained use by all. 5 Each
user of a communal pasture, this tale asserts, is economically stimulated to
increase the size of his animal stock on the pasture to secure for himself a
greater share of the communal resource, a result that leads ultimately to
overuse and degradation. A second model, the familiar bundle-of-sticks
metaphor, likens land ownership to possession of a bundle of individual
sticks each representing some right to use, alter, transfer, bequeath, or
destroy the item of property.76 A mature legal system, this metaphor sug-
gests, will recognize all possible land use rights and will allocate each
right to some person or group of people. A third model, frequently tied to
W.N. Hohfeld, posits that property rules deal not with relationships be-
tween people and things but rather with relationships among people with
respect to a thing."7 Items of property have no rights, only people have
rights, and the property rights of people are their rights as against other
people to decide when, in what manner, and by whom an item of property
will be used.
These three models-the tragedy of the commons, the full bundle of
sticks, and the view of property law as jural rights among people-all
focus attention on the division of rights among people, an ideological ori-
entation that seems value laden when considered in historical and cultural
perspective. All assume that each piece of property will have a principal
owner rather than multiple owners. None of the models asks, at least not
directly, whether some sticks in the bundle should be possessed by no one.
None asks whether items of property might themselves have defensive
"rights" in the sense that no person has the right to abuse, exhaust, or
destroy the item of property. The tragedy of the commons, it would seem,
will not be fully solved by dividing the commons into separately owned
parcels, for each parcel owner would remain free to abuse it to the detri-
ment of future owners. The tragedy can be solved only by allocating
limited use rights in a manner that will allow no one to overuse or ex-
haust the land.
As a contrast to these three popular images of property rights, students
75. See Hardin, supra note 51.
76. The classic discussion of ownership, A. M. Honore's noted article of that title, lists all of the
sticks that would be included in a full bundle and suggests that a mature legal system will recognize
and somehow allocate among persons all of the elements of full ownership. Honore, supra note 17.
For one view of the development of the bundle-of-sticks metaphor and a discussion of the values that
it incorporates, see Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in XXII NoMos: PROPERTY 69 (1980). For
uses of the metaphor, see, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). The meta-
phor has long been in use. See Hallowell, supra note 74, at 123 n.20.
77. This analysis was developed fully decades ago by W.N. Hohfeld, whose analysis has remained
highly regarded. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). But see C. STONE, SHOULD TREEs HAVE STANDING? (1974) (sug-
gesting that natural objects in some sense may have rights).
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of property would do well to read and ponder historical studies such as
these works by Cronon and Innes. Changes in the Land and Labor in a
New Land contain no answers to current issues. Their value lies rather in
raising the questions and in showing us, through the presentation of alter-
native approaches to land use and property ownership, that land use ide-
ologies develop over time and that our current ideology may well need
adjusting. These very substantial contributions make both volumes worthy
of our attention.
